Loading ...Noland: I’m always fascinated when highly intelligent market professionals say peculiar things. I’m still not over Ray Dalio’s concept of “beautiful deleveraging” from some years back. When I first heard Prince’s comments, I thought immediately of the eminent American economist Irving Fisher and his infamous, “Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau” – just days ahead of the great 1929 stock market crash.
But there is an analytical framework behind Prince’s view worthy of discussion. I’m with him completely when it comes to, “Cycles in growth are caused by the boom and bust in Credit.” In a historical context, I can accept “those expansions and contractions of Credit are largely driven by changes in monetary policy.” I agree “you’re not going to get a tightening of monetary policy.” Prince says central banks are “in a box,” while I prefer “trapped.”
But it is as if Mr. Prince is suggesting there is now some type of equilibrium condition that precludes a boom and bust dynamic. I would counter that central banks are locked in a position of administering extreme monetary stimulus, fueling a runaway boom that will end in a historic bust. Markets clearly expect ongoing aggressive stimulus (QE) from all the major global central banks.
And I don’t buy into the “rates are near zero because of stagnation” argument. The Fed cut rates three times in 2019 due to market fragility and the risk of a faltering Bubble – that had little to do with U.S. economic performance. Global rates are where they are because of acute global Bubble-related fragilities and resulting extreme monetary stimulus. Low global market yields (and negative real yields) are more a Bubble Dynamic than a reflection of deflationary forces. A historic boom/bust dynamic has global bond markets anticipating enormous prospective central bank bond purchases (QE).
The critical question: Can runaway booms descend into busts without a tightening of monetary policy? The answer seems a rather obvious “absolutely”. I don’t believe the Fed’s timid tightening measures in 1999 and early 2000 precipitated the bursting of the Internet and technology Bubble. The Fed was cutting rates aggressively into 2002, yet that didn’t arrest the bust in corporate Credit. I would strongly argue the Fed’s even more cautious 2006/2007 rate increases were not the catalyst for the bursting of the mortgage finance Bubble. In reality, in the face of strengthening Bubble Dynamics, financial conditions loosened significantly as the Fed tiptoed along with its so-called “tightening” cycle.
The Fed emerged from the 1994 tightening cycle recognizing that contemporary finance – with its hedge funds, speculative leverage, derivatives and Wall Street securitized finance and proprietary trading– carried an elemental propensity for excess and instability. That was effectively the end of Federal Reserve policy tightening cycles. From then on, it was cautious little “baby steps” to ensure the Fed wouldn’t upset the markets.
The “tech” and mortgage finance booms were left to inflate free from central bank restraint. Uncommonly painful busts were inevitable. Today’s most protracted all-encompassing global boom has not only been left free to inflate, central bankers continue their multi-trillion spending spree to pressure nonstop inflation. I do agree: when this fiasco runs its course, it certainly won’t be boom and bust “as we know it.”
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